I. Introduction
From the perspective of a regular contributor to YARS, the years 2010-2011 are notable for a number of reasons. First, as expected by the Authors, far more regulatory than competition law decisions and judgments were delivered. A particularly large number of them concerned the telecoms sector, seven in total, far more than in any other economic area. Second, the Commission adopted only a handful of State aid decisions following a formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU. Third, some EU merger and infringement decisions directly considered Polish specificity.
Four out of the seven 'Polish' telecoms cases of 2010-2011 were preliminary references submitted to the Court of Justice of European Union (hereafter, Court of Justice or CJ) by Polish courts. Three preliminary rulings were issued in the context of disputes between the UKE President -the national regulatory authority responsible for telecoms (hereafter, NRA) -and Polish telecoms operators. The fourth, concerning the interpretation of Regulation 1/2003, had its origins in a dispute between the UOKiK President -the national competition authority (hereafter, NCA) -and the telecoms incumbent Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (hereafter, TP). In two preliminary rulings (concerning Regulation 1/2003 and number portability charges), the CJ sought the written opinion of the Advocate General. The CJ also rendered judgments in infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against Poland for its failure to perform a market analysis necessary to impose regulatory measures in telecoms and for its non-compliance with the EU Directive on reutilisation of public information. The General Court (hereafter, GC) issued an order dismissing, on formal ground s, the action for annulment submitted by the UKE President against a Commission decision adopted in the framework of the Article 7 mechanism 1 . The significant size of the Poland-related output of the Court of Justice in 2010-2011 shows the potential for an increase in the number of 'Polish' cases dealt with in the EU and the resulting need to focus on key developments in the future. Finally, the Commission has adopted a prohibition decision against TP (an appeal against this decision is pending).
It should be noted also that the Commission adopted in 2010-2011 very few Polish State aids decisions following a formal investigation procedure under Article 108(2) TFEU. There may be several reasons behind this phenomenon. The Commission is focusing its enforcement efforts, particularly on the financial sector, which limits the scope for ex officio enforcement against cases of lesser importance. The Polish authorities may also have been less pro-active in notifying aid. It is also possible, however, that the UOKiK President's work and the overall efforts made in the run up to and during Poland's EU Presidency may have lowered the scope for contentious issues with the Commission. The economic crisis may also be taking its toll drying up the sources of State support. In addition to the low number of State aid decision, no new infringement cases were brought to the CJ against Poland and no veto decisions were issued under the Article 7 mechanism for telecoms.
Finally, account has to be taken of particular Polish aspects of other EU decisions and judgments. This concerns Kraft's purchase of Cadbury and the resulting sale of the E. Wedel to an independent Japanese purchaser. It also concerns Poland's approach to granting marketing authorisations for medicine which, while facilitating market entry of generic drugs and thus arguably lowering healthcare costs, was found to be in breach of applicable EU law.
II. Case summaries 1. Antitrust Jurisprudence

UOKiK v Tele 2 Polska
On 3 May 2011, the CJ's Grand Chamber ruled 2 on two preliminary reference questions regarding the ability of NCAs to adopt 'negative' decisions, i.e. decision stating that no infringement of Article 102 TFEU occurred 3 , when an NCA applies national competition law to an abuse prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, it should also apply the later Article alongside its national law (Article 3). To this effect, Regulation 1/2003 authorises the NCA to adopt decisions requiring an infringement to be brought to an end, ordering interim measures, accepting commitments, imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their national law (Article 5(1) ). In case ruling clarifies the division of competences between the European Commission and NC As 4 as laid down in Regulation 1/2003 5 .
The problem arose in the context of antitrust proceedings before the Polish NCA concerning the potential abuse of dominance by the incumbent operator, TP. Following an investigation, the UOKiK President concluded that TP's behaviour did not constitute an abuse and thus, that its conduct did not amount to an infringement of national laws and of Article 102 TFEU. If an antitrust infringement was not established, Polish law applicable at that time required the NCA to adopt a decision declaring that the practice in question had not restricted competition 6 . The UOKiK President adopted such decision stating that TP had not implemented any restr ictive practice under Polish competition law. As far as Article 102 TFEU was concerned, the UOKiK President merely brought the procedure to an end on the grounds that it was devoid of purpose. In other words, the NCA did not adopt a negative decision with respect to Article 102 TFEU because it considered that Regulation 1/2003 did not allow it to issue a negative decision on the merits as regards the assessment of the compatibility of the scrutinised practice with EU competition law.
Tele 2 Polska, one of TP's key competitors and a third party to the antitrust proceedings, challenged the UOKiK decision. In the course of this dispute, the Polish Supreme Court asked the CJ two preliminary questions, i.e. whether (i) EU law precludes the NCA, if the latter fails to establish a restriction of competition, from adopting a negative decision on the merits, and (ii) Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 is directly applicable and can constitute a legal basis for a decision issued by an NCA.
In line with Advocate-General Mazak's opinion 7 , the CJ replied to both questions in affirmative. It confirmed that Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 precludes the application of national rules insofar as they empower NCAs to issue 'negative decisions' with respect to EU competition rules. It is the sole competence of the Commission to find that a given practice does not breach Article an NCA finds that, on the basis of information in its possession, the conditions of prohibition of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU are not met, the NCA may adopt a decision stating that there are no grounds for action on its part (Article 5(2)). 4 The judgment has been summarised in the European Competition Network (ECN 101 and 102 TFEU. Otherwise, the uniform application of EU competition law would be undermined as a national decision finding that no infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU occurred could prevent the Commission from later adopting a decision finding that a breach of EU competition rules has taken place. The CJ also confirmed that Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 was directly applicable and could constitute a legal basis for a decision issued by an NCA. The judgement gave rise to a renewed discussion on the rationale and objectives of the 2004 reform of the EU competition law enforcement model. Some commentators point out to the inconsistency in giving power to the NCAs to adopt infringement decisions while preventing them from finding no breach of EU competition law. Such model is understood as maintaining the Commission's exclusive power to issue 'negative clearance' letters as used before 2004 8 . The CJ judgment is therefore perceived as running counter to the logic of the decentral isation of EU competition law enforcement introduced by Regulation 1/2003 . It is seen as resulting in legal insecurity for companies, and a definite restriction in the procedural autonomy of Member States in their enforcement of EU competition law 9 . The judgment might also be considered as impeding the judicial review of national antitrust decisions for those whose interests are affected by an NCA de facto finding that no infringement of Article 101 and 102 TFEU has taken place despite the fact that such finding is not articulated in the form of a formal decision on substance 10 .
BR/ESBR cartel
On 13 July 2011, the GC rendered several judgments 11 concerning the BR/ESBR Decision 12 issued by the Commission on 29 November 2006. The 8 Certain commentators see the NCAs' inability to issue negative decisions as a way to avoid the re-establishment of the old notification/exemption system but this time at the national level (see S. Brammer in: (2012) in cartel meetings (e.g. expense reports, notes from the meetings and witness statements) was not sufficient to support the conclusion that Tavorex (and thus Kaučuk/ Unipetrol) participated in the cartel. While some other evidence (notably the general leniency statement given by Bayer referred to in the part of the BR/ESBR Decision that relates to the description of the cartel) was considered to have a certain probative value, the GC found such general statements insufficient 18 to justify the finding that Tavorex (and thus Kaučuk/ Unipetrol) participated in the cartel.
As the GC annulled the BR/ESBR Decision due to lacking evidence with respect to the three aforementioned CEE companies, it did not examine their other pleas in law, notably the issue of the relationships between principals and agents in the context of competition law infringements.
The Commission did not challenge the GC judgments regarding TradeStomil, Kaučuk and Unipetrol. Neither did it appeal the partial annulments of the BR/ESBR Decision with respect to the Italian producer ENI SpA ('ENI') and its subsidiary Polimeri Europa SpA 19 , or the US producer The Dow Chemical Company and its subsidiaries (Case T-42/07).
Commission Decisions
Telekomunikacja Polska
On 22 July 2011, the Commission adopted a decision (hereafter, TP Decision) 20 finding that the Polish telecoms incumbent TP 21 had abused its dominant position on two Polish markets for wholesale broadband services by refusing to grant access to its fixed telephone network to Alternative Operators (hereafter, AOs). Taking into account the gravity and duration of the infringement (4 years 2 months), the Commission imposed on TP a fine of EUR 127.5 million (after deducting several fines previously imposed by the 18 Some evidence regarding cartel meetings gave rise to doubts that must act in favour of the applicant (see , not yet published. That said, in 2012, the Commission sent ENI a letter in which it communicated its decision to recommence the BR/ESBR procedure despite the judgment in which the GC re-determined the amount of the fine. ENI appealed the letter in Case T-240/12 and argued lack of competence (in light of the GC's exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction, the Commission could not recommence the procedure with a view to adopting a fresh decision imposing fines). The appeal is pending. 20 Poland's fixed telephone network (specifically, the digital subscriber line, DSL) is its main platfo rm of broadband internet access. TP is the only operator with a country-wide DSL network. If AOs wish to provide broadband internet access services to end users via a DSL, they can either build an alternative local access network (which is uneconomical due to high sunk costs) or obtain remunerated access to TP's network. To obtain access, AOs can in principle purchase from TP either: (a) wholesale broadband access (BSA) or (b) unbundled access to the local loop (LLU). BSA wholesale services consist of selling to AOs data transmission capacity over TP's fixed telephone network 26 . The LLU wholesale services involve the grating of physical access to the 'last meters' of the telephone network infrastructure leading to end user premises (the so-called local loop 27 or the sub-local loop 28 ).
Both the EU and national regulatory framework in force at the time of the proceedings imposed an obligation on TP (as on the operator with significant market power on the fixed public telephone network) to grant access -both BSA and LLU under Polish law -and to publish a Reference Offer ('RO') in that respect 29 .
The Commission identified three relevant product markets in this case: two separate wholesale servic es markets for BSA and LLU as well as the downstream retail product market for standard broadband access services 26 BSA is defined in recital 50 of the TP Decision. 27 As defined in recital 53 of the TP Decision. 28 As defined in recital 53 of the TP Decision. offered at a fixed location to end users 30 . The relevant geographic market for all three services was found to cover the entire territory of Poland.
The Commission found TP dominant on all three relevant markets. In particular, as regards the wholesale markets for BSA and LLU, it identified TP as the only supplier of such services in Poland and thus an unavoidable trading partner. The decision identifies also TP's high market share in the retail market and the existence of significant barriers to both entry and expansion.
The Commission found that TP had abused its dominant position on the two wholesale markets by refusing to supply BSA and LLU wholesale services to AOs. The incumbent was seen as deliberately preventing, or at least postponing, the entry of AOs onto the Polish market for broadband services with the view of protecting its customer base and revenue on the downstream retail broadband access market. To this effect, TP was, inter alia, proposing unreasonable conditions for access to its network and wholesale broadband products, delaying access negotiations, obstructing the implementation of access agreements (e.g. by rejecting orders in an unjustifiable manner), as well as refusing to provide reliable and accurate general information indispensable for AOs to operate (e.g. technical specifications relating to data transmission and equipment, etc.). The Commission concluded that TP's abusive conduct was likely to reduce the rate of entry and expansion of its DSL competitors on the downstream retail market for broadband Internet access services. As a result, TP delayed the growth of competition and thereby the development of alternative infrastructure. The incumbent's conduct could have been detrimental for final consumers, possibly leading to a low broadband penetration rate, high broadband prices and low average broadband connection speeds. The Commission ordered TP to cease the infringement in so far as it had not done so already and to refrain from engaging in the same or equivalent conduct in the fuThe TP Decision also discussed TP's arguments as regards the Commission's lack of competences to act in a field which is highly regulated by national law, and which is subject to the supervision and intervention of an NRA (the UKE President). The Commission considered, however, that its competence was not affected by the existence of regulatory decisions imposing fines with respect to TP's obligations to provide network access and to treat AOs in a non-discriminatory manner. The Commission referred to the CJ judgment in Deutsche Telecom 31 where it was held that sector specific regulations did not exclude the application of EU competition 30 The market for retail broadband access services encompasses all technologies providing broadband access (incl. DSL lines, cable, LAN/WLAN and others) except retail broadband access provided via mobile networks. rules. It emphasised also the regulatory character of the intervention by the NRA (UKE decisions did not consider the applicability of Article 102 TFEU) and the fact that TP did not change its behaviour despite being already fined by the UKE President. The Commission did, nevertheless, deduct the amounts of several fines imposed earlier by the NRA and already paid by TP from the total fine it imposed on TP 32 .
Moreover, TP argued that the Polish competition authority had in 2008 closed its own investigation against TP without finding an infringement. As regards the effects of such decision and its impact on the Commission's competences to investigate, the TP Decision noted a different scope and different focus of the two investigations 33 . It also recalled the conclusions of the Tele 2 Polska preliminary ruling where the CJ held that NCAs do not have the competence to formally declare that an infringement of Article 102 TFEU had not taken place. Therefore, a negative decision issued by an NCA cannot prevent the Commission from subsequently finding that the same practice is in breach of EU competition law 34 .
TP appealed the TP Decision on 2 September 2011 35 alleging failure to demonstrate a legitimate interest in pursuing a case regarding historic conduct, the violation of human rights (imposition of a criminal penalty by an administrative body) and rights of defence, as well as several factors leading to fine reduction. The appeal is pending.
Mergers Commission Decisions
Not unlike in previous years, most merger decisions concerning Polish companies or Polish markets issued in 2010-2011 did not raise competition concerns. Notified transactions were either (i) unconditionally approved in Phase I, or (ii) identified concerns were eliminated by way of remedies but neither the concerns nor the remedies related to markets in Poland 36 . 32 D. Kamiński, A. Rogozińska, B. Sasinowska, supra note 25. 33 According to the TP Decision, the UOKiK investigation had much narrower scope. The NCA investigated TP's practices in the context of providing BSA services to Netia and GTS only and the investigation was conducted in the context of the potential infringement of the collective consumer interests (Art. 
Kraft Foods/Cadbury
On 6 January 2010, the Commission conditionally approved 40 the takeover of Cadbury (United Kingdom) by Kraft Foods (United States). Kraft Foods is a global food and beverage company active in over 150 countries. Cadbury is a producer and seller of chocolate and sugar confectionary active in over 60 countries. The companies' activities overlapped mainly with regards to the production and sale of chocolate confectionery and, to a minor extent, sugar confectionery, biscuits, soft cases and chocolate drinks. The consolidation of their chocolate confectionary businesses gave rise to significant overlaps in 19 Member States, including Poland and Romania where preliminary competition concerns were identified.
The Commission distinguished three separate market segments within the overall market for chocolate confectionary: (i) chocolate tablets (chocolate blocs of more than 59 g); (ii) countlines (small individually wrapped chocolate bars) and; (iii) pralines. In line with its earlier decisions, the geographic market for chocolate confectionary was seen as national.
The Commission observed that the transaction would lead to high combined market shares of Kraft/Cadbury (significantly out-sizing their competitors) on the markets for chocolate tablets in Poland and Romania, and on the market for chocolate pralines in Poland. The decision emphasised the close competition existing between the brands of the two companies prior to their merger. In Poland, the tablets and pralines offered by Kraft under its Milka and Alpen Gold brands are regarded as the closest substitutes for the Polish 'iconic' Wedel brand, belonging to Cadbury. To address these concerns, Kraft offered to divest Cadbury's domestic Romanian chocolate confectionary businesses as well as the Polish business conducted under the Wedel brand. The Commission accepted the commitments and approved the transaction 37 The CJ also examined whether the procedures, laid down by Protocol No. 2 of the 1991 Europe Agreement 47 by which the aid was brought to the notice of both the Commission and the Council gave rise to legitimate expectation for the appellants regarding that aid. 48 The CJ noted that the right to rely on the protection of the legitimate expectations principle extended to any person in a situation where an EU authority had, by giving it precise assurances, caused that person to entertain justified expectations 49 . While the appellants argued that various documents and acts had given them such precise assurances, the CJ upheld the finding of the GC that the condition of precise assurances had not been met and the 2005 HCz Decision had not undermined the appellants' legitimate expectations.
Finally, the CJ dismissed as inadmissible or unfounded the claims concerning the 'appropriate' interest rate applicable at the time of recovery.
Commission v Poland (Buczek -Recovery)
On 14 April 2011, the CJ delivered a ruling 50 in an infringement case concerning Poland's failure to implement Commission Decision 2008/344 (hereafter, Buczek Decision) 51 . CJ co ncluded that addressees of Buczek Decision, i.e. Technologie Buczek (TB), Huta Buczek (HB) and Buczek Automotive (BA), had made no repayment or only partly repaid the illegal aid identified in the Buczek Decision. In their defence, the Polish authorities relied on several technical (e.g. missing documents) and legal (notably a risk of 'double repayment' 52 ) arguments to justify the delays in aid recovery.
The CJ agreed with the Commission's application and found Poland in breach of Article 249 EC and Articles 3 and 4 of the Buczek Decision. It held, 47 Protocol No 2 of the Europe Agreement, signed in Brussels on 16 December 1991 (OJ [1993 L 348/2), concerning European Coal and Steel Community products provided that public subsidies were prohibited in principle while containing five-year derogation for the ECSC steel products from the general prohibition. The five-year derogation period was subsequently extended until the Accession. 48 The ISD Polska (Huta Czestochowa) judgment, supra, para. 52 Poland argued that a risk of 'double repayment' arose from the absence of a legal basis enabling administrative bodies to abandon the debts owed to them by TB, including amounts which should be recovered from TB's subsidiaries. Moreover, if those debts were repaid, there would be no longer any legal basis in Polish insolvency law enabling TB to recover from its subsidiaries the sums paid by it.
in particular, that the registration of the addresses' debts was delayed and had not constituted a proper implementation of the Buczek Decision, and that the amount recovered from TB had not corresponded to the amounts meant to be recovered. It also held that Poland had failed to show that implementing the Buczek Decision has proven absolutely impossible. The CJ re-confirmed established jurisprudence that apprehension of internal difficulties in the course of implementing a State aid decision could not justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its obligations under EU law 53 .
While the judgment confirms once again the principles applicable to Member State obligations to recover unlawful State aid, its practical implications appear limited in light of the GC judgment in Case T-1/09 Buczek Automotive v Commission, as discussed below.
Buczek Automotive v Commission
On 17 May 2011, the GC issued a judgment 54 The Commission stated in the Buczek Decision that Polish authorities had failed to recover public debts from BA's parent company, Technologie Buczek. Their behaviour was found to have failed to comply with the 'private creditor' test whereby non-enforcement of public debt constitutes State aid if it is done on terms unacceptable for a private creditor operating under normal market conditions. The Commission found that Polish authorities not only held 'good' securities against which they could have enforce the debts but were also aware of the poor prospects for TB's future performance. The Commission thus concluded that their behaviour amounted to granting illegal aid to TB. As the company has meanwhile fallen into bankruptcy, the Commission required debt recovery from two of its subsidiaries: Huta Buczek and Buczek Automotive considering that these companies had, according to the Commission, benefitted from the alleged aid. All three companies had filed appeals against the Buczek Decision, although TB and HB withdrew their submissions at a later date.
The GC judgment is notable for two main reasons. First, it held that the Commission had not presented sufficient evidence that State aid had indeed 53 The ISD Polska (Huta Czestochowa) Judgment, supra para.72 and the case-law cited therein. 54 43, pp. 191-193. been granted to TB by misapplying the 'private creditor test'. Second, the GC stated the Commission did not prove that the aid distorted competition 57 .
As regards the first point, the 'private creditor test' is used to establish the conditions under which a public sector debts is to be repaid to avoid being categorised as State aid 58 . The 'private creditor test' was developed along the lines of the 'private investor test' 59 . While the latter involves a comparison of a private investor who is investing money with a view to receiving a return on that investment, the 'private creditor test' considers whether the State, just like a private creditor, seeks to maximise the re-payment of debts owed to it 60 . The GC held that BA was granted an advantage in that the authorities allowed it a period of time during which it could freely dispose of its assets without being forced into insolvency 61 . The GC proceeded to analyse whether the Commission had shown if such approach is consistent with the behaviour of a private creditor. The Commission did not perform a detailed analysis / comparison of the returns to be obtained under different recovery solutions available to the Polish authorities. The GC ruled therefore that the Commission had lacked the material elements enabling it to assert that a private creditor would have opted for insolvency proceedings as the best debt recovery method. As a result, the Buczek Decision was annulled in so far as the Commission had found that Poland had unlawfully granted State aid to TB 62 . 57 It is worth noting also that BA and HB argued that the aid had been granted to a different legal entity, TB, and that the Commission was not entitled to require recovery from BA and HB (no legal basis for assuming that the subsidiaries could have been the actual beneficiaries of the aid which had been granted to their parent). However, the GC did not address the question of liability. 58 E.g., a payment facility granted by a public authority must be regarded as State aid whenever the recipient would manifestly have been unable to obtain the resulting economic advantage from a private creditor in a comparable situation (Case C-256/97 DM Transport, [1999] ECR I-3913, para. 30). For non-recovered public debts, public bodies must be compared to a private creditor who is seeking to obtain recover overdue debts from a debtor in financial difficulties As regards the second point, the GC annulled the Buczek Decision because it found that the Commission had not provided sufficient reasons for finding that competition and trade between Member States had been distorted / affected by the measure. This approach follows other judgments in which the GC and CJ presented similar considerations 63 .
The Commission appealed the GC judgment on 28 July 2011 64 . The appeal focuses on the requirement envisaged by the GC whereby the Commission must calculate gains from various debt enforcement methods and to compare the duration of the various public debt recovery procedures. The Commission argues that it is not obliged to carry out precise calculations of this kind but merely to take account of the factors that a private creditor would consider. The Commission challenges the GC ruling as it placed upon it the obligation to adduce additional evidence to reject the argument concerning the conduct of a private creditor. The Commission is also of the opinion that Protocol No. 8, used as its decision's legal basis, is sufficient to show that the aid in question distorts or threatens to distort competition.
Commission Decisions
During 2010-2011, the Commission adopted only two Polish State aids decisions 65 following a formal investigation procedure under Article 108 (2) TFEU. This may be explained by various factors, including: (i) the Commission focusing its enforcement efforts on the financial sector; (ii) lack of Polish notifications (and UOKiK's efforts to screen and advise Polish authorities on State aid issues), and; (iii) the economic crisis. 66 . The plan envisaged the transfer of PZL-Hydral's profitable assets to PZL Wroclaw. While the latter was to be privatised (and resources obtained from privatisation were to cover part of the accumulated debts), PZL Hydral was to be liquidated. Approximately PLN 130 million (EUR 37.5 million) of public funds were estimated to be spend in the form of capital injections and a loan 67 from the Polish Industrial Development Agency 68 .
PZL Hydral
PZL
On 10 September 2008, the Commission adopted a decision initiating a formal investigation procedure with respect to the aforementioned measures. However, a further decision was adopted on 12 November 2008 which extended the investigation to cover additional State support measures which the Commission meanwhile identified (amounting to PLN 218.6 million 69 ).
Polish authorities have subsequently modified PZL Hydral's restructuring plan and, notably, withdrew the investment injections of PLN 113 million. In light of such developments, the Commission adopted a decision on 4 August 2010 70 closing the PZL Hydral investigation because it concluded that the various measures provided to that company did not constitute State aid as they had been granted on market terms (met the private investor and/or private creditor principles). 72 , the UKE President required TP to terminate its practice of making the provision to end users of its 'neostrada tp' broadband internet access service conditional upon the conclusion of a telephony services contract. The NRA based its decision on Article 57(1) of the Telecommunications Law Act (hereafter, Telecommunications Law) 73 which expressly prohibite d making the conclusion of a contract for the provision of publicly available telecoms services contingent upon the conclusion of a contract for other services, or for the purchase of equipment from the service provider. Article 57 (1) The dispute reached NSA which decided to ask the CJ for a preliminary ruling regarding whether the contested national provision is compatible with the Electronic Communications Framework. The CJ ruled that neither the Framework Directive 75 nor the Universal Service Directive precluded national legislation which, in order to protect end-users, prohibited bundling. The Court focused on the fact that the Polish provision, which generally and without discrimination prohibited linked sales, did not affect the powers of the NRA to, inter alia, define and analyse markets or impose regulatory obligations. Neither did the Directive provide for full harmonisation of the consumer protection field. The Universal Service Directive is explicitly without prejudice to EU rules on consumer protection or national consumer protection legislation conforming to EU law.
Regulatory cases (preliminary rulings and infringements) Electronic communication
Telekomunikacja Polska v UKE
Nevertheless, the CJ found that national legislation which, with certain exceptions and without taking account of specific circumstances, imposes a general prohibition of combined offers by a vendor to consumers was in fact incompatible with EU consumer protection law (notably the Unfair 72 The UKE decisions have not been published. 73 Article 57 (1) Follo wing the preliminary ruling, the NSA dismissed as unfounded TP's appeal (cassation) 78 . Given that the scope of the appeal was limited to the scope of the complaint (compatibility of Article 57 (1) 
Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (PTC) v UKE (number portability charge)
On 1 July 2010, the CJ answered 80 a preliminary question submitted by the Polish Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of the Universal Service Directive. The latter obliges Member States to, inter alia, ensure that all subscribers of publicly available telephone services (including mobile networks) may retain, if they so request, their numbers despite switching telephone providers. The preliminary question related to the direct fee that could be charged for the use of number porting service.
The number portability service carries with it certain costs for operators. Typically, the donor operator (the number is ported from its network) charges the recipient operator (to whom the subscriber ports his number) an interconnection charge incurred when dealing with such request. The recipient may recover all or part of that cost by passing it on to its subscribers. This is done either directly (by way of a one-off payment charged to the subscriber using number porting facility) or indirectly (where the cost is included in the price of telecoms services).
In addition to ensuring the availability of number porting services, the Universal Service Directive obliges Member States to ensure that its pricing for interconnections related to the provision of number portability is costoriented and that direct charges, if applied, do not discourage consumers from using that facility 81 On the basis of a consumer survey, the UKE President decided that the level of the contested fee dissuaded PTC's subscribers from porting their numbers to a new mobile operator. The results of the survey indicated that phone users were prepared to pay for that service no more than 50 PLN (approximately 12 Euro). PTC challenged the UKE decision on the grounds that a number porting charge could not be set without reference to costs incurred when providing it. PTC's appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court which asked a preliminary reference question to thAs clarified by Advocate-General Bot 83 , the matter before the CJ was not whether the service should be free of charge (although he noted in his Opinion that such a solution, if pursued by the EU legislator, would have several advantages). Rather, the question arose as to how best to control the pricing of number portability. AG Bot criticised the UKE President's 'subjective' methodology relying solely on the results of a consumer survey. He noted that the method used by an NRA to assess whether a direct charge had a dissuasive effect had to be consistent with principles governing interconnection pricing to ensure its objectivity, full effectiveness and transparency.
The CJ examined the preliminary question in the context of its earlier Mobistar judgment 84 concerning the interconnection fees charged between operators. The CJ stated therein that such prices were to be set up on the basis of their costs 85 and that NRAs can fix, in advance and on the basis of an abstract model, the maximum costs which may be charged by the donor operator to the recipient operator as set-up costs. That is so provided that prices are fixed on the basis of costs in such a way that subscribers are not dissuaded from making use of the number portability facility 86 . Agreeing with AG Bot, the CJ stated in the PTC judgment that NRAs must identify, using an objective and reliable method, both the actual cost incurred by operators 81 Article 30 (2) of the Universal Service Directive. 82 The UKE decision has not been published. 83 and the level of direct charge beyond which subscribers are unlikely to port their numbers. Following that examination, an NRA must oppose a direct charge likely to act as a disincentive to consumers even if it is in line with costs incurred by operators when providing the service. In other words, always taking into account the actual cost of number porting, an NRA can fix a ceiling for the direct charge lower than the actual costs if it arrives at the informed conclusion that a fully cost-oriented direct fee would be likely to dissuade users from porting numbers 87 .
Some commentators argued that while cost levels remain an objective factor, the notion of a charge that does not discourage consumers from number porting is in principle a subjective benchmark 88 . This subjectivity would remain despite the fact that the CJ judgement requires that objective cost factors must be taken into account to define the maximum permissible number porting charges. It seems that the difficulty in balancing those objective and subjective elements have not gone unnoticed by the Polish regulator and thus the revised Telecommunications Law Act of 24 April 2009 abolished altogether the possibility of using direct charges for the number portability service.
PTC v UKE (Publication requirements)
On 12 (2008) The CJ confirmed that, in line with Skoma-Luc and Balbiino, it follows from Article 254(2) EC (now Article 297 TFEU) that EU regulations and directives which are addressed to all Member States cannot produce legal affects unless they have been published in the OJEU. They cannot be enforced against natural or legal persons in a State before those persons have had an opportunity to get acquainted with them through their proper publication. The publication requirement also applies to situations in which EU legislation obliges Member States to adopt measures imposing obligations on individuals.
The CJ concluded that the 2002 Guidelines did not lay down any obligations capable of being imposed, directly or indirectly, on individuals. It was also found that the transitional regime applicable to the accessions period (Article 58 of the Act of Accession) implied that Member States and institutions were to select EU acts for publication in the OJEU. The possibility that certain acts might not be published was thus not ruled out. The fact, therefore, that the 2002 Guidelines had not been published in the OJEU in the language of 91 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ [2002] 103 . SOKiK found that the UKE President had no legal basis for imposing the fine in light of the CJ judgment in Case 545/08. SOKiK's judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeals 104 .
Pharmaceuticals
Commission v Poland (Pre-Accession marketing authorisations)
On 22 December 2010, the CJ delivered a judgment 105 in infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against Poland in relation to its authorisation requirements for medicinal products.
The case had its origin in Polish administrative practice predating its EU accession on 1 May 2004. Transitional provisions annexed to the Act of Accession 106 contained derogation from the applicability of quality, safety and efficacy requirements contained in Directive 2001/83 EC 107 . They stated that all authorisations for pharmaceutical products issued under Polish law prior to its EU accession should stay valid until they are prolonged in compliance with the acquis or until 31 December 2008 (whichever is the earlier) 108 .
Several marketing authorisations were issued immediately before Poland's EU accession, including an authorization for generic versions of the reference product Plavix. The Commission challenged the administrative practice of Polish authorities granting such authorizations under national law applicable at the time despite the lack of required documentation and on a conditional basis (although issued before the accession, the authorisations have not become effective until after that date). The Commission argued that such conditional authorizations should not benefit from the derogation provided in the Act of Accession. They should, therefore, have complied with EU law from 1 May 2004 onwards. In the Commission's view, the contested authorisations did not comply with the requirements and procedures of relevant EU directives and The Polish government argued that the validity of marketing authorizations issued before its EU accession remains the issue of national law; therefore, the EU lacks competence in that respect.
The CJ disagreed an ruled that the Commission proceedings concerned Poland's compliance with the conditions of the derogation granted under the Act of Accession, rather than the validity of Polish administrative acts. The CJ confirmed the competence of the EU to examine the conditions for the derogation, and whether they have been met. As regard the latter, the CJ found to the contrary. Therefore, CJ concluded that Poland had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law by maintaining in force the contested authorisations and by placing and keeping on the market of medicinal products whose marketing authorisations were not issued in accordance with EU law even after 1 May 2004. 
